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CONSENT FOR AMICUS FILING 
Plaintiffs/appellants Bigler and the Utah Taxpayers 
Association ("UTA") and defendants/appellees Vernon and Payson 
City ("Payson City") have previously consented to the appearance 
of Salt Lake City Corporation ("the City") as amicus curiae as 
required by Rule 25, Utah R.App.P. 
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 
§78-2-2(3)(f), Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Should this Court recognize a "legislative/ 
administrative-ministerial" dichotomy in the setting of tax 
levies by local governments? 
2. Is the setting of a "tax levy" subject to a citizen 
referendum pursuant to either §20-11-21(2), U.C.A., or Article 
VI, Section 1(2) of the Constitution of the State of Utah? 
3. Is the prohibition of referendums on tax levies provided 
by Section 20-11-21(2) unconstitutional pursuant to Article VI, 
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution? 
4. Is the setting of a municipal tax levy a matter of 
"state-wide concern"? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented by amicus are purely legal questions; 
therefore, no deference is accorded to the District Court's 
decision. Hill v. Seattle First National Bank, 821 P.2d 457 
(Utah 1992). To the extent that the constitutionality of §20-11-
21(2) U.C.Ae is attacked by UTA, the statute should be "presumed 
to be valid, until the contrary is shown beyond all reasonable 
doubt." State ex rel. Breeden v. Lewis, 26 Utah 120, 72 P,2d 
388, 389 (1903). See, also, State v. Taylor, 541 P.2d 1124 (Utah 
1975) and Salt Lake City v. Savage, 541 P.2d 1035 (Utah 1975), 
cert, denied, 425 U.S. 915 (1976). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
1. Applicable provisions of the Utah State Constitution 
A, Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 1: 
The Legislative power of the State shall be 
vested: 
2. In the people of the State of Utah, as 
hereinafter stated: 
The legal voters or such fractional part 
thereof as may be provided by law, of any 
legal subdivision of the State, under such 
conditions and in such manner and within such 
time as may be provided by law, may initiate 
any desired legislation and cause the same to 
be submitted to a vote of the people of said 
legal subdivision for approval or rejection, 
or may require any law or ordinance passed by 
the law making body of said legal subdivision 
to be submitted to the voters thereof before 
such law or ordinance shall take effect. 
B. Utah Constitution Article XIII, Section 5(a): 
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for 
the purpose of any county, city, town or 
other municipal corporation, but may, by law, 
vest in the corporate authorities thereof, 
respectively, the power to assess and collect 
taxes for all purposes of such corporation. 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
contained in this Constitution, political 
subdivisions may share their tax and oth€>r 
revenues with other political subdivisions as 
provided by statute. 
2 
2. Applicable State statutes; 
A. Utah Code Ann. §20-11-21, reads as follows: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this 
chapter, the legal voters of any county, 
city, or town, in numbers required by this 
chapter, may initiate any desired legislation 
and cause it to be submitted to the governing 
body or to a vote of the people of the 
county, city, or town for approval or 
rejection, or may require any law or 
ordinance passed by the governing body of the 
county, city or town to be submitted to the 
voters before the law or ordinance takes 
effect. 
(2) (a) The legal voters of any county, 
city, or town may not initiate budgets or 
changes in budgets, or tax levies or changes 
in tax levies. 
(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or 
town may not require any budget or tax levy 
adopted by the governing body of the county, 
city or town to be submitted to the voters. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Proceedings before the District Court. 
The City adopts the "Proceedings" statement submitted by 
Payson City. 
II. Statement of Facts. 
The City adopts the Statement of Facts as presented by both 
Payson City and UTA. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
SETTING TAX LEVIES OR RATES IS A LEGISLATIVE 
ACTION. 
Both UTA and Payson City, for completely different reasons, 
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invite this Court to make a non-existent and improper 
classification of the setting of municipal tax levies as, 
variously, "legislative", "administrative" or "ministerial". UTA 
argues to this Court that, because Payson City's utility revenue 
tax was a "new" tax, it was "legislative". This apparently 
implies that, at least possibly, the revision of rates of an 
existing tax may be "administrative". (Brief of UTA p. 20.) UTA 
then contradictorily contends that the terms "budget" and "tax 
levy" as used in Section 20-11-21(2) refer: 
Solely to the ministerial processes associated with 
administering a budget or setting a tax levy pursuant 
to legislative fiat and does not include the 
legislative decisions taken in appropriating money for 
a budget, enacting a new taxing scheme, or in setting a 
tax rate which involves a policy choice rather than 
ministerial arithmetic calculations. 
(Brief of UTA, p. 26.) Apparently UTA is arguing that some 
aspects of tax "legislation" are not, in fact, "legislation" but 
are, instead, "administrative" or "ministerial". 
Payson City also confusingly takes both sides of the issue 
as to whether or not setting tax rates is "legislative" or 
"administrative". Arguing that setting budgets and tax levies is 
part of the complex process of government, Payson City contends 
that these activities are not simply "administrative" or 
"ministerial". (Brief of Payson City, pp. 22-27.) On the other 
hand, Payson City tries to rely on Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty 
Co., 3 Utah 2d 1, 277 P.2d 805 (1954) by arguing that Payson's 
enactment of a utility tax was "as administrative act" and 
therefore not subject to the legislative referendum provisions of 
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Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution. 
The City, as amicus, suggests that this Court decline to 
participate in the semantic gymnastics suggested by both UTA and 
Payson City. Simply put, enacting a new tax, repealing an 
existing tax, or changing the rates of a tax are legislative 
acts. They are inseparably intertwined with establishing public 
policy and the exercise of the legislative "power of the purse" 
that is the core function of legislative power. This is 
especially true in a jurisdiction, such as the City, which has an 
elected executive and a separate legislative branch. Martindale 
v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978). 
Specifically, the municipal council of a municipality 
adopting either the council-mayor or council-manager form of 
government is solely empowered to pass budgetary and taxing 
ordinances. Section 10-3-1210, U.C.A. 
Determining the appropriate types of taxes and their rates 
involves policy questions and sophisticated calculations as to 
what monies will be raised by the various taxes and their rates. 
These issues, however, do not render the setting of rates 
"administrative" or "ministerial" as suggested by UTA and Payson 
City. Rather, they demonstrate the essential "legislative" 
character of the matters. Enacting taxes and establishing their 
rates are part of the complex legislative process of matching 
revenue with spending, meeting ongoing legal bond requirements, 
funding capital projects and, otherwise, establishing the policy 
of government that is properly vested in the legislature. 
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In adopting budgets and taxes the legislative body of a 
municipality must follow the detailed provisions of the Uniform 
Fiscal Procedures Act for Utah cities, Section 10-6-1, et seq. , 
U.C.A. This process includes, specifically, the setting of 
property tax levies and the calculation and enactment of other 
necessary taxes and rates so that the budgets are balanced. See 
Sections 10-6-109, 110, 117, 120 and 134. 
This case does not involve the administrative/ministerial 
function of the executive branch of government applying a 
legislatively adopted tax rate to a specific property or 
taxpayer. Instead, the questioned tax was a new revenue 
producing scheme, adopted by ordinance as part of the legislative 
process of raising and spending the funds necessary to operate 
Payson City. It will not serve clarity or predictability of the 
law to judicially create some "administrative"-"legislative" 
dichotomy to analyze referendum law in Utah.1 
There is no profit to be gained by this Court in 
characterizing certain parts of the enactment of tax levies or 
rates as "legislative" and other parts as "administrative" or 
"ministerial". Instead, this Court should straightforwardly 
declare that the enactment of taxes and the setting of tax rates 
xFor the last several years the bench, bar and citizens of 
Utah have been involved in trying to understand the earlier 
semantic distinction made under the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions. See, 
Section 63-30-1, et seq., U.C.A. and Standiford v. Salt Lake 
City, 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). We all now are struggling with 
the new semantic concept of "core" governmental functions versus 
"non-core". 
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by municipalities is a "legislative" action. The Court should 
then face, squarely, the next two logical issues. First, is the 
municipal establishment of a tax or the setting of a tax rate 
precluded from being the subject of a referendum pursuant to 
Section 20-11-21, U.C.A.? Second, if such a referendum is 
prohibited, is Section 20-11-21 unconstitutional pursuant to 
Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah? Such a 
straightforward analysis is in the best interests of the State. 
II. 
SETTING TAX LEVIES OR RATES IS NOT SUBJECT TO 
REFERENDUM PURSUANT TO SECTION 20-11-
21(2)(b), U.C.A. 
Given that the enactment of taxes and their rates are 
"legislative", the next issue for this Court is whether or not 
Section 20-11-21(2)(b), U.C.A., prohibits such a legislative act 
from being referred to the voters. The City concurs with Payson 
City that such a referendum is specifically prohibited. The City 
adopts and concurs with the arguments made in Points III and 
IV(A). (The City's disagreement with Payson's Point IV(B)(2) is 
stated in Point IV of this Brief, below.) 
In addition to the arguments made by Payson City, the City 
also raises another principle of statutory construction in 
support of the argument that Section 20-11-21(2)(b) prohibits 
referendums on budgets and tax levies. Besides the fact that 
subsection 21(2)(b) is clear on its face and without need for any 
Procrustean semantics, it is also true that subsection (b) must 
be read in conjunction with subsection 21(2)(a). A basic 
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principle of statutory construction is that provisions should be 
read in light of each other and interpreted as a whole to make 
sense. Crist v. Bishop, 520 P.2d 196 (Utah 1974). 
Thus, the phrasing of subsection (a) can be used as a guide 
to what was meant by subsection (b). Subsection (a) deals with 
initiatives and is phrased in dual pairs. That is, voters cannot 
initiate or change budgets and voters may not [initiate] or 
change tax levies. It is, therefore, clear that when enacting 
subsection (a) the legislature was prohibiting direct legislation 
not just on tax rates (or levies) but also on the initiation of 
taxation itself. 
The legislature's phraseology changed for understandable 
reasons when enacting subsection (b). As opposed to subsection 
(a)'s dual pairs, subsection (b) simply prohibits the reference 
of adopted budgets or tax levies to the voters. The obvious 
reason for the semantic shift is that once the budgets and tax 
levies have been adopted by the governing body there is no longer 
any logical need to refer to the dichotomy between initiation and 
changing. Thus, when subsection (b) is viewed in light of its 
logical counterpart, subsection (a), it is clear that subsection 
(b) is not subject to the convoluted reasoning implied by UTA 
that purports to distinguish between the implementation of a 
"new" tax (which UTA claims may be subject to a referendum) and 
the change in the rate of an existing tax (which UTA implies may 
not be subject to a referendum). In fact, Section 20-11-21(2)(b) 
prohibits the submission of any municipal tax legislation, either 
8 
enacting new taxes or modifying the rates of existing taxes, to 
the voters. 
The legislature's preclusion of both initiatives and 
referendums on taxes and rates is a recognition of the needs of 
practical governance. In fact, if budgets and taxes could be 
referred or initiated the result would be chaos and anarchy. 
For example, the Utah Fiscal Procedures Act requires that 
all revenue sources be first determined. Thereafter, the 
property tax rate is adjusted, as a last resort to balance the 
proposed expenditures. 10-6-111(e), U.C.A. The final budget 
must be completed before June 22 of each year (August 17 in case 
of a rate increase as defined by law). The proposed property tax 
rate is then forwarded to the State Tax Commission, which must 
certify the rate as within the rate cap of .007 and in compliance 
with law. 10-6-133 U.C.A.; 59-2-919, 923 U.C.A. 
The dates for these taxing events and review are tailored to 
the practical resolution of getting assessments adopted, levied 
and collected against thousands of individual parcels of property 
on levies by numerous overlapping taxing jurisdictions. (See 
generally Chapter 2 of Title 59 U.C.A.). Allowing referendums on 
any one of the City's taxing sources would make the local 
government's ability to honestly set a property tax levy (the tax 
of last resort) virtually impossible. A referendum challenge or 
threat would simply force the legislative body to gamble funding 
governmental services on the vagaries of a popular vote or 
attempt to clandestinely inflate revenue from stable revenue 
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sources. Either prospect is contrary to the policy of the Fiscal 
Procedures Act. This law requires total anticipated revenues to 
equal expenditures and makes it illegal to have expenditures in 
excess of budgeted appropriations. Section 10-6-110(2) U.C.A. 
Given the low level of voter signatures required to force 
initiatives or referendums it is possible that a city might 
literally never get a budget. If the UTA were successful, 
virtually every item on the revenue side of a budget, and by 
implication the expenditure side, would be subject to a 
referendum. The paralysis that would occur while the budget sat 
ineffectual until the next election would seriously impair 
governmental ability to pay bonded obligations or even continue 
the most basic of operations. 
Would the taxes be collected during the budget's period of 
suspended animation? Would City employees such as police and 
fire personnel be paid during the suspension? From what source? 
Merely to raise these issues illustrates the wisdom of the 
legislative decision that budgets and taxation in our 
representative form of government cannot be subject to either 
initiatives or referendums. 
III. 
SECTION 20-11-21(2)(b) IS NOT BARRED BY 
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 1 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
Having reasoned that the enactment of taxes and their rates 
is a legislative function of a municipal government, and that 
such actions are specifically prohibited from being the subject 
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of a referendum by Section 20-11-21(2)(b), the next issue before 
this Court is whether or not that section violates Article VI, 
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution- The City contends that it 
does not. 
The City concurs with Payson City that the provisions of 
Article VI, Section 1 are not "self-effectuating". That is, 
without legislative enactment the provisions of Article VI 
Section 1 are simply inchoate and without effect - a right 
without a remedy. Because Article VI, Section 1 specifies that 
the legislature may impose conditions upon the power of 
referendum and initiative such activities may not take place 
beyond those lawfully set conditions. This must be true because, 
absent specific requirements in the Constitution, what does 
Article VI, Section 1 mean? How many voters constitute the 
"fractional part" entitled to require initiatives and referendum? 
What is the "manner" by which such initiatives and referendum may 
be considered? What is the "time" for holding such initiatives 
and referendum? 
The Constitution is an organic document meant to provide the 
philosophy and framework for government. It is not meant to 
provide all of the nitty gritty details of governmental 
operation. The Constitution, therefore, allows the legislature 
to condition the power of referendum and initiative. The 
legislature has seen fit to condition that power by precluding 
its exercise in the case of budgets and tax levies. As noted 
above, practical government supports the legislative preclusion. 
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Section 20-11-21(2) is well within the power to "condition" 
referendums and initiatives allowed by Article VI, Section 1 of 
the Utah Constitution. 
IV. 
MUNICIPALLY ESTABLISHED TAX RATES ARE NOT A 
MATTER OF "STATE-WIDE" CONCERN. 
In an attempt to explain another reason why tax levies 
should not be subject to referendum, Payson City contends that 
its utility tax is of "state-wide concern" and thus not subject 
to a referendum pursuant to Burkett v. Youngs, 135 Maine 459, 199 
A. 619 (1938), cited with approval in Dewey, supra. While it is 
true that the ability of a municipality to tax a state regulated 
utility is limited by state statute, that fact is not tantamount 
to making an individual city tax a state-wide issue. 
This Court has upheld the Public Service Commission's ruling 
that all local tax impositions are to be added as surcharges to 
the service tariffs. As such, all City tax assessments are 
imposed only within that city and have no state-wide impact. 
Qgden v. Public Service Commission, 123 Utah 437, 260 P.2d 751 
(1953).Thus, so long as the municipality's tax on a utility 
complies with the provisions of Chapter 26 of Title 11, there is 
no state-wide interest in the tax. 
Payson City has obviously made its "state-wide concern" 
argument on a "make weight" basis. The City, as amicus curiae, 
urges this Court to reject basing its ruling in any way on this 
argument. Such a ruling could only add confusion to the law as 




The enactment of taxes and setting of tax rates is a 
"legislative" action at the heart of the existence of municipal 
government. This Court should not enter into a semantic thicket 
attempting to divide local government taxation between 
"legislative", "administrative" and "ministerial" functions for 
the purposes of determining which part thereof might be subject 
to referendums or initiatives. 
The power to tax and establish budgets is the ultimate 
"legislative" action by local governments. As such, it is, in 
its entirety, specifically precluded from being the subject of 
voter initiatives or referendums pursuant to Section 20-11-
21(2)(b) Utah Code Ann., 1953. The referendum statute is clear, 
especially when its two subsections are construed together, and 
the UTA's deconstructionist reading is both illogical and 
unavailing. Allowing budgets and tax levies to be the subject of 
initiatives or referendum would ensure that local government's 
finances and operations descended into chaos and anarchy. 
Because Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution 
allows the legislature to condition the rights of referendum and 
initiative the constitutional provision is not "self-
effectuating". Instead, the reasonable conditions imposed by 
Section 20-11-21 Utah Code Ann, are precisely in keeping with the 
letter and the spirit of Article VI, Section 1. They are also 
necessary for the continued reasonable functioning of municipal 
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government. 
Finally, this Court should decline Payson City's invitation 
to declare that municipal taxes are a matter of state-wide 
concern. 
Because local taxation is a legislative action specifically 
precluded from referendum and initiative this Court should affirm 
the District Court's decision dismissing UTA's claims. 
DATED this ^ u day of June, 1992. 
KCGER r. CUTLER 
City Attorney 
'/ 
UJCE R. BAIRD 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake City 
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